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Case Studies
Mergers
MAR
MONTE PLANNED PARENTHOOD MERGER CASE STUDY 1997-1999
by La Piana Associates, Inc.
Dwight Cochran and David La Piana
INTRODUCTION
In the Spring of 1997, The James Irvine Foundation provided funding to study
a merger in the nonprofit world. The motivation was that while there is a growing
body of prescriptive work on the topic, there is still a paucity of descriptive,
case-specific information, particularly of a longitudinal nature. It was becoming
clear that many nonprofits could better use their meager resources by joining
forces. The Mar Monte Planned Parenthood in San Jose, California and the Central
California Planned Parenthood agreed to allow the study of their impending
merger.
Our methodology consisted of periodic interviews with representative staff
members from both merging partners: five senior managers from Mar Monte (including
the CEO) and a total of five staff members from all levels at Central California.
Interviews were supplemented by document review.
By examining this merger, and previous mergers that Planned Parenthood Mar
Monte had been through, a pattern emerges that can be useful to other nonprofits
attempting their own mergers. To better understand a merger it can be broken
down into separate phases. Each phase brings out different emotions. The process
can be facilitated by understanding and planning ahead for the emotions of
each phase. Surprises and shocks are generally not good for organizations and
by being able to expect what is going to happen the process will be smoothed
out.
The following is a graph that approximates the employee outlook (on a scale
of negative to positive) toward the merger over the course of the two-year
study. Phase one demonstrates the apprehension and hope around the time of
the merger. Phase two encompasses the initial letdown after the merger occurs.
Phase three is the time that some of the kinks have been worked out and progress
is being made. And phase four shows the successful results that can occur once
the two organizations become one.

PHASE ONE - August 1997
In the years leading up to the merger, Central California Planned Parenthood
was in a downward spiral. Despite the fact that its clinics were offering top-notch
services, it was collapsing financially. Revenues were not covering expenses
and it had a poor fundraising track record -- so when the crisis hit it had
nothing to fall back on. Loans were taken out for operations and payroll, and
no money was being set aside for program development.
Over time, more problems arose. Center sites and medical equipment needed
repair. Computers and phone systems were inadequate to handle patient loads.
There were shortages of key family planning products in the clinics. There
were even threats of shutting off power to some clinics if overdue bills were
not paid.
When the long term Executive Director left, Elena Love was brought in as the
Interim Director to conduct an assessment of the situation. With employee morale
at a low and the money supply practically exhausted it was clear that large
changes were needed. So in December of 1996 Elena presented the plan to pursue
a merger with Mar Monte Planned Parenthood to the Board of Directors. The Board
of Directors unanimously approved the idea and negotiations with Mar Monte
began.
Mar Monte had completed three mergers during the previous year so staff were
initially overwhelmed by the idea. But by March 1997 Mar Monte realized the
necessity of the merger and the Board of Directors gave its approval for the
merger to occur in July.
The universal reaction of Mar Monte employees was "Oh my God, not another
merger." But they also knew that, given Mar Monte's mission imperative,
and the state of the health care industry, there was little choice in the matter
so they went into action to prepare for the July date. One point that helped
Mar Monte was that they had been through the merger process many times in the
previous year and felt they knew what they were doing and what to expect. Although
this did not help reduce the workload, it did help reduce some of the tension.
This was not the case with the CC staff. They had no idea what they were getting
themselves into. But, since it had gotten to the point where many of them had
to bring their own pens to work, they knew that something had to change. Most
CC employees basically had the attitude of "Merge or Die."
During the time leading up to the merger most of the CC employees felt they
were being pretty well kept up to date on developments. Elena circulated weekly
memos focussed on the merger. The one key area of stress for the employees
was that they knew little about Mar Monte and had minimal contact with the
organization and its personnel.
The official day of the merger was very traumatic mostly due to the fact that
all of the paperwork (forms, protocols, etc.) changed in the clinics as they
adapted those used by Mar Monte. There had been some short, general training
sessions in advance, but none with the actual forms. The forms themselves did
not arrive until two days before the merger so there was little time to understand
them. At the time of the first round of interviews a month later, there were
still many misunderstandings and complications concerning the correct use of
the forms.
There was also a general feeling of having to do it the "Mar Monte Way" and
that there was really no room for discussion. Many former CC employees felt
that they were being made to "jump through hoops" while at the same
time they were not getting responses to all of their concerns. From Mar Monte's
perspective, they had just revamped many systems due to previous mergers, and
could not expect their own, much larger group of employees, to once again change
their systems, in order to accommodate the Central California group's much
smaller staff. Mar Monte's management made this position known early and repeatedly
during the merger consideration process. While this stance makes good sense,
the emotionality of a merger lead some CC employees to take exception to the
approach.
Overall, the CC employees were upbeat about the merger despite the trauma
of all the changes. There was a general feeling that once they got over this
initial hurdle, things would improve and settle down. Employees in key centers
like Fresno had contact with staff from Mar Monte and could see that Mar Monte
was making an effort.
Mar Monte staff meanwhile were overworked but unfazed. They felt they knew
what to expect and that they would somehow get the job done. They had done
it before and they could do it again. To add to their confidence, they were
also quite impressed with the CC employees that they had been working with.
PHASE TWO - February 1998
The second round of interviews was conducted six months later in February 1998.
Elena Love, who had been the Interim Director of CC left to become Mar Monte's
Director of Organizational Integration so she was the point person relating
to the merger. She, as well as most of the other Mar Monte managers, felt
that things were basically on track with the merger. Mar Monte sensed discontent
among the CC region staff but this was not a real cause for alarm. As a matter
of fact, this discontent followed a post-merger cycle that they expected.
Now that the merger had taken place and the brief honeymoon was over the
reality of having to make it work set in: day-to-day life had begun. Having
gone through previous mergers, Mar Monte expected this phase after the initial
euphoria concerning the merger subsided.
Mar Monte was also experiencing structural problems - mostly in the form of
growing pains. The increased number of clinics and staff swamped various departments
in Mar Monte - predictably, the problems became particularly acute in departments
such as accounting and purchasing. At the time of this round of interviews
Mar Monte fully expected that these departments would soon be able to incorporate
the increased workload.
There had been a substantial effort by Mar Monte managers in the previous
months to travel to Central California to spend as much time as possible with
the CC region staff. Most senior managers made many trips a month to establish
bonds and ties with their new employees. As effective as the visits were, they
also took a toll on the Mar Monte staff. During this time, Mar Monte began
to notice some potential problems with the communication structure put in place
for the CC region. At times communication was less than perfect. Up to this
point, once Elena had moved to the corporate offices, there had been no point
person for the CC region staff to link up with Mar Monte. So Mar Monte named
Tammie Rutledge, the Site Manager in Bakersfield, to act as the CC region point
person. Mar Monte felt this would help to alleviate the feeling of the CC region
being isolated.
Six months post-merger, many CC region staff were undergoing what came to
be referred to as Post Merger Stress Syndrome: a general downturn in their
level of optimism toward the merger. Many changes that had been expected, such
as cost-of-living increases, had not occurred, and were not even on the foreseeable
horizon. Mar Monte had been viewed as the savior, but that initial glow was
now waning.
All the CC region employees interviewed at this point mentioned two positive
aspects of the merger. The first was that they felt more financial security
- both personally and for their organization. The second was that they felt
job security. Since there had been no job security promises before the merger
this was a very big concern and people seemed to be feeling more comfortable
about it now.
CC region employees also were feeling stresses related to differences between
the two organizations' cultures. For many CC employees, especially those not
based in key areas like Fresno, Mar Monte signed their checks but remained
basically nameless and faceless. The CC employees might not have known the
corporate staff's names but they could certainly feel the Mar Monte presence.
The CC region clinics' slower pace, with emphasis on the personal touch, was
being replaced by Mar Monte's more businesslike culture of judging performance
by the numbers. Clinics were compared to one another based on their monthly
numbers, a new concept for the CC region employees and one that was going to
take a while to get used to.
PHASE THREE - September 1998
In September of 1998 the third round of interviews was conducted. As the merger-savvy
folks at Mar Monte had predicted, many of the troubles with the merger were
being worked out and morale was noticeably higher. There was still a lot of
extra work for the Mar Monte staff but a structure to ease the workload was
slowly being put into place. For instance, new supervisor positions were added
to the CC region to help cut back on the travel schedules for Mar Monte employees.
For the clinics, the new model added Area Supervisors to help with information
flow. The next step is to work with the Area Supervisors to develop their problem-solving
skills so issues are resolved within the CC region and fewer get sent back
to Mar Monte.
Mar Monte was also able to make an investment in Community Education Programs
for the CC region. This was an area that had been previously lacking and was
in need of improvement. Several new Health Educators were added and it is turning
out to be an excellent investment. The Education Department at Mar Monte also
held a one day celebration for all the educators in the Mar Monte system. This
received an excellent reception and allowed everyone to get to know each other
and begin developing bonds.
The CC region staff are still frustrated over the bureaucracy of Mar Monte.
Communication has definitely improved to the key CC areas but is still lacking
with the outlying clinics. Also, some of the improvements that were expected
with the merger - such as computers and Internet access - have not yet happened.
Overall the morale of the CC region employees is up. Despite some of the previously
mentioned problems, they are aware that their situation is far superior to
the pre-merger days. Also, they are optimistic that things will continue to
improve. One key sign that the merger is going well is that there has been
very little staff turnover since the implementation date. More staff has been
added and that has increased the efficiency of the programs as a whole.
PHASE FOUR - March 1999
Phase four is the final phase of the study. Interviews were conducted in March
1999. As the study is concluded the merger was no longer on the forefront of
people's minds. Most staff interviewed had not been thinking about the merger
and rather had focused on the day-to-day issues of operating a Planned Parenthood
organization.
The Mar Monte staff now view the CC region employees as part of their big
happy family. Most people are proud that the merger went so well ("We
finally got it right") and that the CC region is flourishing. There are
still changes being made to the structure to improve efficiency, and some departments
are still behind schedule, but overall Mar Monte has moved on to focus on improving
its own internal systems.
The feeling among the CC region staff is that work is far more stable and
less chaotic. They are adapting to the more "businesslike" style
of Mar Monte and beginning to see improved results. There is still frustration
of having to do everything the "Mar Monte Way." Many employees feel
that some procedural adaptations are necessary based on the differences of
their communities. Also, communication to the outlying areas still needs to
be improved. But, the key factor here is that despite the various remaining
issues, there is a deep felt loyalty to MM for having kept the CC region afloat.
THE NUMBERS
It is interesting and necessary to examine the merger from the quantitative
as well as the qualitative perspective. There are two key indicators that Mar
Monte Planned Parenthood uses to determine the efficiency and effectiveness
of its clinics. It seems appropriate to examine these indicators for our purposes.
The first indicator is the number of monthly visits per clinic. At the CC region
clinics there was a 19% increase in visits in the first year after the merger,
and a 43% increase over the whole 19-month period. None of the clinics reported
a decrease in visits.
Visits
July 1997
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July 1998
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1997-1998 Change
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March 1999
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1997-1999 Change
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4278
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5081
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19%
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6116
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43%
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The second key indicator for Mar Monte Planned Parenthood is monthly revenue
per clinic. Revenue for all of the CC region clinics improved 34% the first
year and after 19 months had nearly doubled at 90%. Once again, none of the
clinics reported a decrease in revenue.
Revenues
July 1997
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July 1998
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1997-1998 Change
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March 1999
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1997-1999 Change
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228,924
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306,155
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34%
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435,169
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90%
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So, not only are the employees happier and operations running more smoothly,
but both service volume and the bottom line have improved dramatically in the
19-month period since the merger occurred.
LESSONS LEARNED
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The emotions of staff going through a merger may tend to follow a pattern
such as that seen here. The Preparation/Anticipation Stage, the Letdown
Stage, the Learning Stage, and the Successful Integration Stage may be
expected in other mergers. Anecdotal evidence from other mergers in the
authors' experience would suggest this is the case. Preparing merger participants
for these stages may help to ease the transition. The employees at Mar
Monte had been through mergers before so they knew what to expect. The
CC region employees, on the other hand, were not able to predict these
stages, making the whole experience much more stressful for them.
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Open dissemination of all information should be the standard leading up
to the merger and every day thereafter. The state of affairs of the organization
- both good and bad - needs to be made clear to all employees. Negative
information should not be hidden and should not be sugarcoated.
This merger with CC has been much easier than the previous Planned Parenthood
mergers. This is due to the fact that it was obvious to the CC staff that
their organization was in serious trouble (when you have to bring your
own pens to work it is difficult to feel that things are being well run).
When you know that things cannot continue as they currently are, it becomes
a little easier to accept change. People do not want to change if they
don't have to, but they will in order to survive.
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It is critical to have a point person for the merger at each of the organizations.
Often, each division is responsible for keeping its counterparts in the
merging organization abreast of current developments. Two problems arise
from this approach. First, information falls through the cracks this way
- crucial data doesn't always make it to those who need it. And second,
there is not someone dedicated to guiding the merger process - rather it
is a part of many peoples' jobs. This leads to different, sometimes contradictory,
statements being made that can cause confusion and uneasiness within the
merging organizations. A point person enhances the dissemination of information
and helps ensure that the same message is being sent to all parties.
Although not always possible, it is beneficial to have an outsider play
the role of merger point person. Elena's lack of personal commitments and
history with the organization allowed for the merger to be implemented
more cleanly and effectively. It is easier in this way to make the difficult,
yet necessary, personnel decisions that may accompany a merger.
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Human contact is critical in mergers. The more frequently the partners'
faces are seen, the more comfortable people become about the merger. Without
that initial human contact, letters, e-mail and phone calls simply reinforce
the concept of distance between the two organizations. Visits, on the other
hand, were repeatedly mentioned as being helpful and reassuring.
Throughout the merger process, the CC employees with the most contact
with Mar Monte staff were the most optimistic about the merger. Those with
less face-to-face communication inevitably had a bleaker outlook. The department
meetings that brought employees from all the various Mar Monte regions
together were effective in establishing ties as well as allowing a cross-pollination
of ideas.
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Constant communication about the merger is critical. Even when there is
not news to report, employees should be updated that there have been no
new developments. This helps ensure that employees do not feel that they
are being left out of the information loop. It is also important to work
with employees to develop a proactive approach to seek out information.
One way to enable this is by providing them with names and contact numbers
of individuals in all of the key departments and to make it clear that
all questions and comments are welcome.
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As structural changes and key personnel decisions are made, staff from
both organizations should influence the decisions. There are times, however,
particularly early on in the merger implementation process, when it is
more effective for the lead organization to make certain decisions. There
were examples in past Mar Monte mergers where compromises were reached
on key decisions and in the end no one was happy. Initial key decisions
need to be made at the time of the merger by the lead organization and
then as time progresses more and more input should be given to the merging
partner.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, there are many valuable lessons that can be learned from the
merger between Mar Monte and Central California. One of the most important,
for the field, is that it took months, even years, to see the ultimate positive
outcome of this merger. Had the merger study consisted of a snapshot taken
at, say, the nine-month mark, it might have reported a negative outcome. Studies
such as this must be longitudinal. More study is needed to confirm our suspicions
that the four stages of emotionality around a merger, identified here, is somewhat
generalizeable to other situations and organizations. It must also be noted
that this merger is representative of the "strong absorbs weak" type
of merger. Mergers of equals may have different trajectories.
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